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bstract
In the last decade there has been a new wave of sovereign bond issuances in Africa. What determines the ability of developing countries to issue
onds in international capital and what explains the spreads on these bonds? This paper examines these questions using a dataset that includes 105
eveloping countries during the period 1995–2014. We find that a country is more likely to issue a bond when, in comparison with non-issuing
eers, it is larger in economic size, has higher per capita GDP, a lower public debt, and a more effective government. Spreads on sovereign bonds
re lower for countries with strong external and fiscal positions, as well as robust economic growth and government effectiveness. We also find that
rimary spreads for the average Sub-Saharan African issuer are higher than in other regions. With regard to global factors, our results confirm the
xisting evidence that issuances are more likely during periods of global liquidity and high commodity prices, especially for Sub-Saharan African
ountries, and spreads are higher in periods of higher market volatility. 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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lower commodity prices, the number of issuances slowed down
and countries that have been able to issue sovereign bonds
2 See IMF (2013), Standard and Poor’s (2013), AfDB, OECD and UNDPeywords: Sovereign bond issuance; Bond spreads; Developing countries; Afr
.  Introduction
Over the past decade or so, a number of low-income devel-
ping countries (LIDCs)1 have issued sovereign bonds in the
 This paper is part of a research project on macroeconomic policy in
ow-income countries supported by the UK’s Department for International
evelopment (DFID). The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do
ot necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF
anagement, or DFID. We thank Camelia Minoiu for providing data on syndi-
ated loans, and Tamon Asonuma, Jana Gieck, Anastasia Guscina, Sean Nolan,
riscilla Muthoora and seminar participants at the IMF for comments on an
arlier draft.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 2026239899.
E-mail addresses: apresbitero@imf.org (A.F. Presbitero), dghura@imf.org
D. Ghura), oadedeji@imf.org (O.S. Adedeji), lnjie@imf.org (L. Njie).
1 The definition of income groups follows the IMF World Economic Outlook
WEO), which distinguishes advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market
nd developing economies (EMDEs, here called also developing countries). Low
ncome developing countries (LIDCS)—60 countries in all—are a sub-group of
ower income EMDEs, defined in IMF (2014). Frontier markets—14 countries in
ll—are LIDCs that have some degree of access to international capital markets
see IMF, 2014 for further discussion).
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879-9337/© 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. Anternational capital markets, driven in part by African frontier
arkets.2 Given the declining trend of aid flows,3 sovereign
onds could represent a sizeable source of external finance,
hich can contribute to the financing of investment projects,
elping LIDCs make progress in closing the infrastructure and
evelopment gap. Since 2005, 15 LIDCs have issued interna-
ional sovereign bonds, 11 of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa
SSA). In 2013, LIDCs issued sovereign bonds amounting to
S$4 billion, and this trend continued in 2014, with Côte
’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Vietnam, and Zam-
ia having issued bonds totaling about US$8 billion (Table 1).
n 2015, partially reflecting worsening global conditions and2014), Gueye and Sy (2015) and te Velte (2014).
3 According to the 2015 OECD DAC bilateral aid (excluding debt
elief) to the least-developed countries fell by 8% in 2014. See OECD at:
ttp://www.oecd.org/development/development-aid-stable-in-2014-but-flows-
o-poorest-countries-still-falling.htm.
ll rights reserved.
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Table 1
International sovereign bond issuances by LIDCs, 1995–2014.
Issuer Issue date Yield at issue Tenor Amt (USD mn) Spread (bps) S&P rating at issue
Moldova 12/10/96 3 30
Moldova 6/6/97 9.88 5 75 340.0 Not rated
Vietnam 10/27/05 7.25 10 750 256.4 BB−
Ghana 9/27/07 8.50 10 750 387.0 B+
Republic of the Congo 12/7/07 8.77 22 480 458.0 Not rated
Senegal 12/15/09 9.47 5 200 691.0 B+
Vietnam 1/26/10 7.07 10 1000 332.7 BB
Côte d’Ivoire 4/8/10 17.35 23 2330 393.0 Not rated
Nigeria 1/21/11 7.13 10 500 372.0 B+
Senegal 5/6/11 9.34 10 500 596.4 B+
Zambia 9/13/12 5.63 10 750 383.6 B+
Bolivia 10/22/12 4.88 10 500 306.0 BB−
Côte d’Ivoire 11/15/12 20 187 Not rated
Mongolia 11/29/12 4.17 5 500 358.0 BB−
Mongolia 11/29/12 5.19 10 1000 358.0 BB−
Tanzania 2/27/13 7 600 600.0 Not rated
Honduras 3/12/13 7.50 11 500 547.9 B+
Rwanda 4/25/13 7.00 10 400 515.7 B
Nigeria 7/2/13 5.45 5 500 381.0 BB−
Nigeria 7/2/13 6.74 10 500 393.0 BB−
Ghana 7/25/13 8.00 10 750 540.0 B
Ghana 7/25/13 10 250
Bolivia 8/15/13 6.25 10 500 347.5 BB−
Zambia 4/14/14 8.63 10 1000 592.6 B+
Kenya 6/24/14 6.88 10 1500 429.0 B+
Kenya 6/24/14 5.88 5 500 418.0 B+
Kenya 12/24/14 5.00 10 500 B+
Kenya 12/24/14 5.90 5 250 B+
Côte d’Ivoire 7/23/14 5.63 10 750 308.9
Senegal 7/30/14 6.25 10 500 379.3 B+
Ghana 9/11/14 8.25 11 1000 572.0 B−
Vietnam 11/6/14 4.80 10 1000 238.7 BB−
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ource: Bloomberg. Updated to end-December 2014.
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Zambia) did so at higher
ields.
What determines the ability of developing countries to issue
onds in the international capital markets? What are the fac-
ors that influence the spreads on these bonds? Do the recent
ond issuances by African countries respond to different factors?
hat can LIDCs learn from the experience of other develop-
ng countries (and emerging markets) that have market access?
o address these questions, this paper examines the experi-
nce of 105 EMDEs during the period 1995–2014, including
2 countries that had issued sovereign bonds at least once in the
nternational capital markets, with the remainder having never
ssued (Table 2).
The analysis builds on a very extensive literature on inter-
ational debt markets in developing countries; see Eaton and
aylor (1986) and Eaton (1993) for an overview. The exist-
ng literature on market access by emerging and developing
ountries considers the probability that a country has access to
nternational markets issuing sovereign bonds and/or contracting
yndicated loans—and possibly the amounts borrowed. Overall,
his literature has underscored the importance of global factors,
acroeconomic stability, fiscal discipline, economic diversifi-
ation, and policies and institutions for accessing international
apital markets.
n
T
b
S1000 435.6 B
Grigorian (2003) focuses on first time and subsequent issues
y emerging economies over the period 1980–2002 and finds
hat both external and internal factors matter: countries with
etter fiscal position, lower inflation and higher per capita GDP
re more likely to issue, and this finding holds better in years
hen global conditions improve (i.e., international interest rates
re lower and US GDP growth is stronger). Thomas (2009)
hows that poor credit rating and political instability adversely
ffected access to international capital markets by LIDCs during
970–2006; his analysis also suggests that debt relief provided
nder the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative
as significantly raised market access by low-income countries.
his is consistent with SBI by LIDCs being mainly concen-
rated among HIPCs (IMF, 2014). Gelos et al. (2011) examine a
ample of 150 developing countries over the period 1980–2000
nd define market access to cover sovereign bond issues or bor-
owing through private syndicated bank loans. Their analysis
hows that larger and richer countries are more likely to access
redit markets; the perceived quality of the institutional setting
s also a key driver of market access, while countries more vul-
erable to shocks are less likely to tap international markets.
wo recent papers investigate also the costs of issue sovereign
onds, with a specific focus on African countries. Gueye and
y (2015) examine the importance of push and pull factors in
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Table 2
Sample.
Code Country SBI Code Country SBI Code Country SBI
ALB Albania 1 ERI Eritrea 0 MNG Mongolia 1
DZA Algeria 0 ETH Ethiopia 1 MAR Morocco 1
AGO Angola 0 FJI Fiji 1 MOZ Mozambique 0
ARM Armenia 1 GAB Gabon 1 NAM Namibia 1
AZE Azerbaijan 1 GMB Gambia, The 0 NPL Nepal 0
BGD Bangladesh 0 GEO Georgia 1 NER Niger 0
BLR Belarus 1 GHA Ghana 1 NGA Nigeria 1
BLZ Belize 1 GRD Grenada 1 PRY Paraguay 1
BEN Benin 0 GTM Guatemala 1 PER Peru 1
BTN Bhutan 0 GIN Guinea 0 POL Poland 1
BOL Bolivia 1 GNB Guinea-Bissau 0 ROM Romania 1
BIH Bosnia & Herzegovina 0 GUY Guyana 0 RUS Russian Federation 1
BWA Botswana 0 HTI Haiti 0 RWA Rwanda 1
BRA Brazil 1 HND Honduras 1 SEN Senegal 1
BGR Bulgaria 1 HUN Hungary 1 SLE Sierra Leone 0
BFA Burkina Faso 0 IND India 0 SLB Solomon Islands 0
BDI Burundi 0 JAM Jamaica 1 LKA Sri Lanka 1
CAF C.A.R. 0 JOR Jordan 1 KNA St. Kitts and Nevis 0
KHM Cambodia 0 KAZ Kazakhstan 1 LCA St. Lucia 0
CMR Cameroon 0 KEN Kenya 1 VCT St. Vincent & Grenadines 1
CPV Cape Verde 0 KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 0 SDN Sudan 0
TCD Chad 0 LAO Laos 0 SUR Suriname 0
CHL Chile 1 LVA Latvia 1 SWZ Swaziland 0
COM Comoros 0 LSO Lesotho 0 SYR Syria 0
COG Congo, Republic of 1 LBR Liberia 0 STP São Tomé and Príncipe 0
CRI Costa Rica 1 LBY Libya 0 TJK Tajikistan 0
CIV Cote d’Ivoire 1 LTU Lithuania 1 TZA Tanzania 1
HRV Croatia 1 MKD Macedonia, FYR 1 TGO Togo 0
DJI Djibouti 0 MDG Madagascar 0 TUN Tunisia 0
DMA Dominica 0 MWI Malawi 0 UGA Uganda 0
DOM Dominican Republic 1 MDV Maldives 0 UKR Ukraine 1
ECU Ecuador 1 MLI Mali 0 VUT Vanuatu 0
EGY Egypt 1 MRT Mauritania 0 VNM Vietnam 1
SLV El Salvador 1 MUS Mauritius 1 YEM Yemen 0
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 0 MDA Moldova 1 ZMB Zambia 1
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that have issued, we separate the sample between regular issuers
(those that have issued in 5 or more years during 1995–2014) and
occasional issuers. We find that regular issuers have higher per
2011; Siklos, 2011; Comelli, 2012; Kennedy and Palerm, 2014; Csontó, 2014;otes: Sovereign bond issuance (SBI) is equal to one for countries that issued at 
s equal to zero have never issued a sovereign bond. There are 52 sovereign bon
etermining bond yield spreads, and show that the average SSA
ountry would have paid 300 basis points more than the aver-
ge emerging market borrowers, as of end-2009. Olabisi and
tein (2015) estimate that SSA countries pay higher coupon rates
han other issuing countries, once controlling for differences in
ncome levels, reserves and indebtedness.
This paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First,
he analysis of sovereign bond issuance (SBI) by EMDEs is
xtended by jointly estimating the factors that influence the
pread on these bonds. Second, the paper captures the experience
n recent years when several African LIDCs issued international
overeign bonds for the first time, thus extending the analysis on
merging markets by Eichengreen and Mody (2000) and Gelos
t al. (2011), as well as work done on first-time issues by devel-
ping countries (Grigorian, 2003; Thomas, 2009; IMF, 2013;
uscina et al., 2014; Gueye and Sy, 2015) (Table 2).4
4 This paper builds on the literature that identifies the determinants of EMDEs’
overeign bond spreads in both primary (Kamin and von Kleist, 1999) and sec-
ndary markets (Bellas et al., 2010; Rocha and Moreira, 2010; Baldacci et al.,
G
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2 sovereign bond between 1995 and 2014. Countries for which the SBI indicator
ers out of 105 developing countries in the whole sample.
A simple comparison of the data on EMDEs that issued
overeign bonds in global capital markets (issuers) and those that
id not issue (non-issuers) provides useful insights. Issuers typ-
cally have higher per capita real GDP, deeper financial markets,
tronger external positions, greater government effectiveness,5
nd are more likely to have had an IMF program in place over the
revious 3 years (compared to non-issuers). Among countriesuscina et al., 2014). These papers generally show that global risk aversion,
acroeconomic fundamentals (especially the fiscal stance) and political risk are
ignificantly correlated with interest rate spreads.
5 Government effectiveness, published in the World Bank’s Worldwide Gov-
rnance Indicators, captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the
uality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from politi-
al pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
redibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al.,
010).
4  Development Finance 6 (2016) 1–15
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Fig. 1. Sovereign bonds and syndicated loans to the public sector. Notes: Based
on annual data for 105 emerging markets and developing economies, over
1995–2012. GDP-weighted averages. Syndicated loans to the public sector
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apita real GDP, stronger external reserve positions, and more
ffective governments than occasional issuers.
The econometric analysis indicates that a country is more
ikely to issue sovereign bonds in the global market when it
s large and has higher per capita GDP (than those that are
maller and less developed), a relatively low external debt-to-
DP ratio, and strong government effectiveness. Spreads on
overeign bonds are lower for countries with strong external
osition and lower public debt, as well as robust economic
rowth and government effectiveness. There is evidence that
nce a country issues for the first time, there is a higher likeli-
ood that it will reissue in the future and at lower spreads. We
nd a catalytic role of IMF programs for market access. With
egard to global factors, we find that bond spreads are lower in
eriods of declining global market volatility, while global liquid-
ty and higher commodity prices are associated with a higher
ikelihood to issue sovereign bonds, especially when consid-
ring SSA countries. Finally, even considering a broad set of
ountry characteristics, we find that spreads on sovereign bonds
ssued by SSA countries are significantly higher than on bonds
ssued elsewhere.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 dis-
usses the data and some stylized facts about sovereign bond
ssuances over the last 20 years. Section 3 presents the empirical
pproach and the associated econometric results, while Section
 concludes.
.  Stylized  facts
.1.  The  dataset
The analysis is based on a sample of a set of 105 EDMEs
uring 1995–2014. Fifty-two of these countries have issued
nternational sovereign bonds at least once since 1995.6 The
ther 53 countries are used as a “control” group; these are
ountries with per capita income level in the same range as the
nes that issued bonds (i.e., countries with a GDP per capita
ower than US$10,000 in 19957), but which did not issue bonds
n global capital market. In contrast to some of the existing lit-
rature (Thomas, 2009; Gelos et al., 2011), the paper focuses
n international bonds, excluding commercial bank syndicated
oans to national governments.8 The motivation for focusing on
overeign bonds is twofold. First, the volume of syndicated loans
s smaller than from sovereign bonds (Fig. 1).9 Second, looking
xclusively at sovereign bonds—for which information on size
6 See Table 2 for countries used in the sample, including those that issued
nternational bonds. Three countries that issued during the sample period are
xcluded due to lack of data (Iraq, Serbia and Montenegro).
7 The adoption of this threshold implies the exclusion from the sample of some
icher countries (Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait,
man, Qatar, Seychelles and UAE).
8 Private placements are excluded. In the recent LIDC experience, only Tan-
ania issued a US$600 million floating rate note in 2013 via a private placement.
or a discussion of government securities and corporate bond markets (see Mu
t al., 2013).
9 The increase in syndicated loans in 2008 and 2009 was due to large borrowing
rom countries in Europe (e.g., Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine).
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cnclude the central government and state/provincial authorities as borrowers.
ource: Dealogic Loan Analytics and Bloomberg.
nd spread at issue is available—allows a joint analysis of fac-
ors associated with the likelihood to issue and the associated
rice.10
Data on sovereign bonds are from Bloomberg and include
nformation on the date of issuance, maturity, amount, yield and
pread at issue. Data on macroeconomic and institutional vari-
bles are from the World  Economic  Outlook  database and the
orld Development  Indicators.
The set of domestic factors included in the model as potential
eterminants of sovereign bonds follows the existing empirical
iterature on market access.11 The analysis takes into account
ifferences in economic development and macroeconomic per-
ormance by including per capita real GDP, GDP growth,
nflation, current account balance as a ratio to GDP, interna-
ional reserves in months of imports, fiscal balance as a ratio to
DP, and external public and publicly guaranteed debt as a ratio
o GDP. The importance of the institutional setting is taken into
ccount by incorporating institutional strength in the analysis,
easured by an index of government effectiveness.
The paper also considers participation in IMF lending pro-
rams as a potential determinant of sovereign bond issuance
nd spread (Mody and Saravia, 2006). On the one hand, IMF-
upported programs may act as a seal of approval, reassuring
nvestors and catalyzing private capital flows; on the other
and, IMF-supported programs could generate moral hazard
nd signal high financial and sovereign risks (Bird, 2007). The
ypothesis that sovereign bond issuance could be persistent is
10 Limited and non-random data availability on prices of syndicated loans pre-
ent an extension of our analysis to the issuance and price of syndicated loans
see Cerutti et al., 2014 for a discussion of data issues).
11 Throughout the paper, we use a standard terminology and consider a country
s having market access or not only on the ground of bond issuance (Grigorian,
003; Gelos et al., 2011). We acknowledge that this is a simplification, as access
o markets depends also on the amounts issued relative to funding needs, tenor,
urrency of denomination and interest rate against benchmarks.
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aig. 2. Sovereign bond issuances and global conditions, 1995–2014. Notes:
ased on annual data for 105 developing countries (52 issuers), over 1995–2014.
ested by including in both equations a dummy variable equal to
ne for countries that have issued at least once in the previous
hree years. Finally, the paper considers country size, measured
y population, since it could affect the ability to borrow because
f the fixed costs associated with market access and the potential
unishment of a default (Faria et al., 2010; Gelos et al., 2011).
We measure the influence of global factors considering the
ield on the 10-year US Treasury notes, as a measure of global
iquidity, and the Vix index as a measure of market volatility.12
s a robustness exercise we will also look at the correlation
etween market access and commodity prices, measured by two
ndexes of energy and non-energy prices published by the World
ank (2015).13
To mitigate the influence of extreme values, GDP growth,
nflation, private credit, total debt, fiscal balance, current
ccount, reserves have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th
ercentiles.14 Summary statistics, definition and sources of all
ariables are provided in Table 3.
.2.  Descriptive  analysis
Sovereign bond issuances by EMDEs in global markets have
teadily increased over time, moving from an annual average of
 per year in the late 1990s, to 12 in the 2000s and 20 since 2010
Fig. 2). During 1995–2014, LIDCs issued 27 sovereign bonds
10% of all SBIs in the sample), 18 of which have been issued by
SA countries. With the exception of Moldova, LIDCs started
12 The CBOE Volatility Index (Vix), computed and disseminated by the
hicago Board Options Exchange, is a measure of market expectations of
ear-term volatility conveyed by S&P500 stock index option prices.
13 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets. We do not
nclude commodity prices and the US rate jointly given its strong negative
orrelation with the energy price index (−0.86) and non-energy price index
−0.76).
14 The main results are not affected when these observations are trimmed (i.e.,
et to missing values) rather than winsorized (i.e., extreme values are set equal
o the 1st and 99th percentiles).
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sig. 3. The distribution of bond spread at issue, 1995–2014. Notes: Based on
ata for 232 SBIs (by 52 countries), over 1995–2014.
ssuing only recently, and SSA countries issued prevalently in
013 and 2014 (Table 1 and Fig. 2).
Global sovereign bond issuances are concentrated geograph-
cally: out of 267 issuances recorded since 1995, 121 are from
urope and Central Asia, 98 from Latin America and the
aribbean, 22 from Sub-Saharan Africa, and 13 each from Mid-
le East and North Africa, and Asia and Pacific region. Limiting
he sample to the 232 issuances for which there are data on
rimary spreads and amounts does not change the overall pic-
ure. The average issuance amounts to about 2.4 of GDP and the
pread is slightly above 300 basis points. However, there is dis-
ersion across regions, with SSA issuances being, on average,
arger (3.8 of GDP) and with higher spreads (458 basis points)
han in other regions (Table 4).
The evolution of primary spreads over time shows a decline
uring 2005–2009, underpinned by strong global conditions,
ut it moderately picked up thereafter, possibly reflecting the
xpanding role of frontier markets and SSA issuers, given that
he latter were able to place international bonds at higher spreads
han the average EMDE (Fig. 3). The average primary spread
or the 25 LIDCs that issued international bonds was 431 basis
oints, while the average spread of the bonds issued by EMDEs
as 291 basis points (the difference between the two sample
verages being statistically significant).
In line with developments in the 1980s and 1990s, sovereign
ond issuances have been influenced by global factors. The num-
er of bond issuances slumped significantly during the peak
f the global financial crisis, when the volatility of markets
ncreased substantially and investors retreated from risky-asset
lasses. Starting in 2010, as risk appetite improved and global
nterest rates further declined, international investors, inclined to
iversify their asset portfolio, resumed their search for yield in a
ow-interest rate environment and sovereigns took advantage of
ow global interest rates to finance themselves in international
arkets. As a result, bond issuances picked up considerably
Fig. 2).
Before formally testing the correlation between country-
pecific characteristics in the run-up to a bond issuance, we
6 A.F. Presbitero et al. / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 1–15
Table 3
Variables’ definition, sources and summary statistics.
Variable Definition Source Mean St. Dev. Min Max Obs
SBI (0/1) Dummy equal to one if the country
issued at least a sovereign bond in the
year, and zero otherwise.
Bloomberg 0.118 0.323 0 1 1851
SPREAD Spread of the sovereign bond over the
EMBI. If a country issues more than
one bond in the year, SPREAD is the
simple average of the single spreads.
Bloomberg 295.794 176.545 0 825 219
Real per capital GDP Real per capita GDP in USD, in
logarithms.
WDI 7.185 1.120 4.775 9.445 1851
GDP growth Real GDP growth rate. WEO 4.313 3.576 −11.967 21.082 1851
Inflation Consumer rice index, annual percent
change.
WEO 16.879 75.442 −4.170 1285.254 1851
PPG external debt (%
GDP)
Public and publicly guaranteed
external debt (% of GDP).
WDI 57.610 45.088 2.202 304.232 1851
Fiscal balance (% GDP) General government net
lending/borrowing (% of fiscal year
GDP).
WEO and country
reports
−2.347 4.088 −16.435 16.911 1851
Current account (% GDP) Balance on current account (% of
GDP).
WEO −5.521 8.096 −34.947 18.233 1851
Reserves (in months of
imports)
International reserves in months of
imports.
WDI, WEO and
country reports
4.726 4.268 0.031 30.307 1851
IMF program in the
previous 3 years
Dummy equal to one if the country
signed at least a loan agreement in
the previous 3-year period.
IMF historical
dataset
0.146 0.197 0 1 1851
Population (logs) Total population, in logarithms. WDI 15.522 1.842 10.642 20.936 1851
Government effectiveness Government effectiveness index,
ranging from approximately −2.5 to
2.5, with higher values
corresponding to better outcomes.
WGI −0.480 0.602 −1.929 1.278 1716
Total debt (% GDP) Public debt (% of GDP). WDI 64.115 50.044 5.474 328.583 1849
Resource rich dummy Dummy equal to one for resource
rich countries and zero otherwise.
IMF (2012) 0.200 0.400 0 1 1851
Aid (% GDP) Net official development assistance
and official aid received (% of GDP).
WDI 7.447 8.952 −0.016 100.386 1803
US rates Yield on the 10-year US Treasury
notes.
Federal Reserve 4.222 1.336 1.800 6.570 1851
Vix index Chicago Board Options Exchange
Volatility Index.
CBOE 20.922 6.138 12.389 32.693 1851
Energy price index World Bank commodity price index,
energy (coal, natural gas and crude
oil).
World Bank
(2015)
76.495 34.535 23.781 125.565 1851
Non-energy price index World Bank commodity price index,
non-energy commodities.
World Bank
(2015)
78.736 18.456 55.355 109.942 1851
Notes: Data refer to annual data for 105 emerging markets and developing countries over the period 1995–2014. The variables GDP growth, inflation, private credit
(% GDP), PPG external debt (% GDP), total debt (% GDP), fiscal balance (% GDP), current account (% GDP), and reserves (in months of imports) have been
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See text for a more detailed discussion of some variables.
Table 4
Sovereign bond issuances and primary spreads, by region.
Region Spread (bps) Size of issuance (% GDP) # issuances
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Sample Overall
Asia and Pacific 341.5 91.0 3.05 4.20 10 13
Europe and Central Asia 255.4 181.9 2.41 1.83 106 121
Latin America and Caribbean 343.6 177.9 2.20 2.62 85 98
Middle East and North Africa 192.0 102.7 1.37 0.81 11 13
Sub-Saharan Africa 458.3 107.3 3.76 2.65 20 22
Whole sample 305.9 180.7 2.43 2.36 232 267
Notes: Data refer to annual data for 105 emerging markets and developing countries over the period 1995–2014.
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Table 5
Country characteristics by access frequency groups.
Variable All countries No issuance Occasional
issuers
Regular issuers Test of equality of means
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N NI-OI NI-RI OI-RI
Real per capital GDP 7.191 105 6.709 53 7.366 34 8.313 18 *** *** ***
GDP growth 4.400 105 4.611 53 4.567 34 3.463 18 * **
Inflation 11.879 105 13.556 53 10.650 34 9.101 18
External debt (% GDP) 57.978 105 63.868 53 52.676 34 50.027 18
Fiscal balance (% GDP) −2.411 105 −2.428 53 −2.079 34 −2.970 18
Current account (% GDP) −5.778 105 −7.159 53 −4.831 34 −3.372 18 **
Reserves (in months of imports) 4.816 105 5.284 53 3.892 34 5.104 18 *
Resource rich dummy 0.210 105 0.259 53 0.242 34 0.000 18 ** **
Population (logs) 15.521 105 15.206 53 15.513 34 16.480 18 ** **
IMF program in the previous 3 years 0.135 105 0.115 53 0.150 34 0.167 18 *
Government effectiveness −0.476 105 −0.689 53 −0.415 34 0.051 18 ** *** ***
Notes: Based on a sample of 105 emerging markets and developing economies. Simple averages over the sample period 1995–2014 and across market access groups.
The “regular issuers” (RI) group includes countries that issued in more than 5 years; “occasional issuers” (OI) includes countries that issued in 5 or less years; and
“no-issuance countries” (NI) groups all countries that never issued a sovereign bond. The variables GDP growth, inflation, external debt, fiscal balance, current
account, reserves have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
* Significant at 10%.
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ndertake some simple cross-country analyses, aimed at deter-
ining possible systematic and persistent differences across
ountries that issued bonds regularly or occasionally and those
hat did not issue. The analysis follows Gelos et al. (2011) and
ivides the sample into three sub-groups:
 No-issuance  countries  (NI): 53 countries that did not issue a
sovereign bond in the sample period 1995–2014;
 Occasional  issuers  (OI): 34 countries that issued sovereign
bonds for less than 5 years;
 Regular  issuers  (RI): 18 countries that issued sovereign bonds
for 5 or more years over the time period 1995–2014.15
The analysis shows that access to international capital mar-
ets is correlated with country characteristics measuring the
evel of economic and institutional development, fiscal and
xternal balances, external reserve position, and dependence on
atural resources (as measured by a resource rich dummy, see
MF, 2012). Table 5 reports the average values of the macroeco-
omic and institutional indicators for the whole sample and for
he three groups, over the entire sample period. A series of mean-
omparison t-tests are conducted to assess whether differences
cross groups are statistically significant. The cross-country
omparison highlights some interesting patterns.
 In comparison with occasional and regular issuers, countries
that did not issue at all have lower per capita real GDP and
have a worse external position, but, on average, grow at a
faster rate.
15 Adjusting the threshold to 10 issuances rather than 5 does not alter the results.
n that case, the 7 regular access countries are Brazil, Croatia, Hungary, Jamaica,
ithuania, Poland, and Ukraine.
s
a
s
t
a
s
p Sovereigns that issued bonds have more effective govern-
ments and are more likely to have had an IMF program than
countries that did not issue.
 There are differences between occasional and regular issuers:
the latter have higher per capita real GDP, stronger institu-
tions, and more external reserves.
 There are no statistically significant differences across the
three country groups with regard to inflation and fiscal posi-
tion.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the correlations between primary
preads and country characteristics in the run-up to issuing
overeign bonds. Macroeconomics variables are measured as
he average of the three-year period prior to each issuance. The
harts show that lower primary yield spreads are strongly asso-
iated with higher per capita real GDP and stronger institutions,
hile there is a moderate association with faster growth, current
ccount surpluses, and higher international reserves. By con-
rast, there is no evidence of a significant correlation between
rimary spreads and the fiscal position, either considering the
overnment balance or external public debt.
.  The  empirical  analysis
.1.  Empirical  speciﬁcation
Access to international debt markets can be modeled as a two-
tep process. The first relates to the willingness of sovereigns to
ccess global markets and of the latter to supply funds. The
econd concerns the price at which demand and supply are set-
led. If unobserved factors that determine bond issuance also
ffect spreads, a standard linear model for the determinants of
overeign spreads at issue would be biased because of sam-
le selection, given that the dependent variable (the spread in
8 A.F. Presbitero et al. / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 1–15
Fig. 4. Spreads and country performance before issuance. Notes: Based on data for 213 SBIs (by 52 countries), over 1995–2014.
 Deve
t
o
a
(
e
m
(
s
fi
o
r
u
s
m
n
m
h
k
t
a
i
a
d
W
f
b
i
s
H
i
i
i
(
m
j
s
o
a
t
b
t
s
P
w
v
i
t
s
y
S
d
a
S
n
i
a
t
p
e
m
e
p
t
p
m
t
c
e
t
a
l
a
i
A
C
A
(
m
u
a
1
t
w
t
3
The maximum likelihood estimates of the 2-equation sys-
tem are shown in Table 5, which reports the coefficients and the
16 If a sovereign issues more than one bond in a given year, the variable SPREAD
measures the (unweighted) average of the spreads of all bonds issued in that year.
17 As the literature identifies a number of determinants of market access andA.F. Presbitero et al. / Review of
he primary market) is observed only for a non-random subset
f country-year observations. Empirically, this problem can be
ddressed by specifying a sample selection model à  la  Heckman
1979). According to this procedure, in the first stage (selection
quation), the probability of sovereign bond issuance is esti-
ated by a standard probit regression, and in the second stage
outcome equation) the primary spread is a linear function of the
et of variables and of the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the
rst-stage regression, which corrects for sample selection bias.
Access to international capital markets is likely to be the result
f demand and supply factors: disentangling these two would
equire an exogenous shock in the demand or in the supply sched-
le. Focusing exclusively on EMDEs (many of which are LIDCs)
hould help minimize the cases of voluntarily absence from the
arket (lack of demand), given that these countries generally
eed large amounts of external funds to finance domestic invest-
ent (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1980; Gelos et al., 2011). Countries,
owever, could still self-select out of international credit mar-
ets, especially in the case of sovereigns with sufficient access
o grants and concessional loans. We take this possibility into
ccount by controlling for participation in IMF-supported lend-
ng programs and, as robustness check, we control also for the
mount of aid inflows. In addition, countries could base their
emand for international bonds on expected borrowing costs.
hile it is difficult to fully control for these costs, especially
or first-time issuers for whom there are no secondary market
ond spreads, the information on expected borrowing costs is
ndirectly taken into account by inclusion of a comprehensive
et of domestic and global controls in the selection equation.
owever, in the absence of an identification strategy, the empir-
cal exercise focuses on factors associated with sovereign bond
ssuance without implying causality.
In the selection equation, the likelihood of a sovereign bond
ssuance (SBI) in the global market by a country is a function of:
1) the 10-year US Treasury notes yield and the VIX index as
easures of global liquidity and volatility (GLOBAL); (2) a set of
 time-varying domestic factors (DOMESTIC); and (3) country
ize (POPULATION). The latter is measured by the logarithm
f population, which is taken as excluding restriction under the
ssumption that it affects only the likelihood to issue but not
he primary spreads, given that, in the presence of fixed costs for
orrowing, smaller countries will access markets less frequently
han larger countries (Faria et al., 2010; Gelos et al., 2011). The
election equation is as follows:
rob(SBI  =  1)i,t =  φ
( 2∑
k=1
GLOBALkt ;
n∑
j=1
DOMESTIC
j
i,(t−1;t−3); POPULATIONi,(t−1;t−3)
⎞
⎠ (1)
here the dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the
alue of one when country i issued at least one sovereign bond
n year t, and zero otherwise, and Φ(·) is the normal cumula-
ive distribution function. In the outcome equation, the primary
pread on the sovereign bond (SPREAD) issued by country i in
b
b
t
vlopment Finance 6 (2016) 1–15 9
ear t (observed exclusively in country-year observations where
BI = 1)16 is a linear function of the same set of global and
omestic factors, plus the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) which takes
ccount of the selection bias:
PREADi,t =  α  +
2∑
k=1
γkGLOBAL
k
t
+
n∑
j=1
βjDOMESTIC
j
i,(t−1;t−3) +  ρIMR  +  ξi,t (2)
In both equations, global conditions include the contempora-
eous values of the 10–year US Treasury notes yield and the Vix
ndex, which may affect both the supply of funds by investors
nd demand for financing by issuing countries. The set of domes-
ic factors includes indicators of overall economic performance,
ast issuances and participation in IMF-supported programs,
xternal sector position, liquidity, fiscal position, and govern-
ent effectiveness, as discussed in Section 2.2.17 All domestic
xplanatory variables are measured as averages in the 3-year
eriod prior to the year of issuance. Taking a 3-year period rather
han measuring independent variables in t  −  1 further mitigates
ossible endogeneity concerns (Gelos et al., 2011) and mini-
izes the incidence of outliers. In addition, this choice assumes
hat market access does not depend on domestic macroeconomic
onditions in place just the year before the issuance, but it is influ-
nced by what happened in the run-up of the issuance. Given that
he inclusion of the dummy variable for lagged issuance—which
ccounts for persistence in market access—may create prob-
ems making the model dynamic, we start showing results for
 model that excludes the dummy for past sovereign bond
ssuance.
The model also includes regional dummy variables (for
sia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and
aribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan
frica) to account for regional fixed effects and spillovers
Dell’Erba et al., 2013), and to measure possible differences in
arket access and spreads across countries that are not picked
p by observable heterogeneity. The baseline analysis takes into
ccount the role of global liquidity and volatility including the
0–year US Treasury notes’ yield and the Vix index. Alterna-
ively, we replace these two variables with year-fixed effects,
hich capture global (common) time-variant shocks and allow
o focus on the role of domestic factors.
.2.  Resultsond spreads, the set of explanatory variables used considers the trade-off
etween the inclusion of the most relevant determinants of market access and
he reduction in the number of observations due to the inclusion of too many
ariables.
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ssociated robust standard errors (correcting for heteroskedastic-
ty). Because of data availability on the set of control variables,
he analysis is based on 219 bond issuances. For each model
pecifications, the first column reports the estimates of outcome
quation (2) and the second refers to the selection equation (1).
e start from the baseline specification and then add the dummy
or past bond issuances (columns 3–4), the measure of govern-
ent effectiveness (columns 5–6) and we finally replace the
0–year US Treasury notes’ yield and the Vix index to add year
xed effects (columns 7–8).
Overall, the analysis shows that sovereign bond issuance
nd spreads depend on global conditions, macroeconomic per-
ormance (the fiscal position and indicators of liquidity), and
nstitutional strength in the run-up to bond issuances. The results
ndicate that country size is a significant predictor of sovereign
ond issuance, as there would be fixed costs for borrowing
hrough issuance (Gelos et al., 2011), validating the exclusion
estriction.18 Regional dummy variables and global factors are
tatistically significant, suggesting the presence of spillovers in
arket access and the relevance of global demand- and supply-
ide factors in the sovereign bond market. As in Eichengreen
nd Mody (2000), the coefficient ρ  on the estimated inverse
ills ratio in the outcome equation is negative (although not
tatistically significant), suggesting that participation in the
nternational debt market is non-random, and that the unob-
ervable political, institutional and economic characteristics of
ountries affecting the likelihood SBI also inversely influence
ond spreads.
The baseline specification (columns 1–2) indicates that
lobal factors matter for market access. When market volatility
ncreases, so do primary spreads (Siklos, 2011; Csontó, 2014):
 one standard deviation of the Vix index corresponds to a 49
asis points change in the spread. The effect of global interest
ates is twofold: lower US rates are associated with a higher
robability that countries issue sovereign bonds, but also with
igher spreads, even though the effect is relatively small. The
stimated coefficients indicate that 1 percentage point reduction
n the US rate translates into a 17 basis-point increase in the pri-
ary spread. This result is consistent with that of Eichengreen
nd Mody (2000) and, as suggested when discussing the styl-
zed facts (see above, Section 2.2), it is likely to be the result
f frontier and Sub-Saharan African markets accessing interna-
ional bond markets in a period of declining global interest rates,
ut placing bonds at spreads higher than the average spread
n bonds placed by EMDEs (Fig. 3).19 Consistent with this
18 Inclusion of population in the outcome equation (2) confirms that country
ize is not correlated with primary spreads.
19 This sort of sample selection effect is consistent with the early literature on
merging markets’ bond spreads, when Fed tightening was associated with a
arrowing, not widening, of bond spreads. One explanation is that initial market
fferings during periods of Fed tightening, which were associated with turbulent
arket conditions, were only possible for the more creditworthy countries (Arora
nd Cerisola, 2001). Supply-side factors could be at play as well: with low yields,
nvestors could look beyond the traditional markets and venture out in more
isky frontiers markets, looking for higher spreads. The fact that the negative
oefficient on US rates is not statistically significant when we exclude the period
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nterpretation, the coefficient on the US rate in the spread equa-
ion is no more significant once we augment the model with
he measure of government effectiveness, which should further
apture the heterogeneity across early and late issuers.
Moving to domestic factors, results show that countries with
igher per capita real GDP levels are more likely to issue
overeign bonds. The coefficient on real GDP growth indicates
hat low-growth countries are penalized when issuing bonds
s they tend to do so at higher spreads (Gelos et al., 2011;
ichengreen and Mody, 2000). The coefficients on inflation
re generally not statistically significant. Countries that had an
MF-supported lending arrangement in the previous three years
re more likely to issue, supporting the catalytic role of IMF
ending (Mody and Saravia, 2006), but they do so at a higher
ost (126 basis points), even though the latter effect is washed
ut by the inclusion of the government effectiveness variable.
nterestingly, this result on IMF-supported programs is consis-
ent with the recent experience of Ghana, which agreed on an
xtended three-year credit facility in April 2015 and later issued
 US$1 billion sovereign bond in July, at a record-high coupon of
0.75%.
The external sector position and liquidity matter too.
ountries with lower current account deficits face lower spreads
han those with higher external deficits and lower reserves, while
here is no evidence of a robust association between the cur-
ent account and the probability of bond issuance. The latter,
nstead, is higher for countries with lower international reserves.
he negative correlation between reserves and the probability of
overeign bond issuance is consistent with the findings of Gelos
t al. (2011) and Olabisi and Stein (2015) and could suggest that
 higher level of reserves insures sovereigns against exclusion
rom credit markets.
The fiscal position is a key determinant of market access.
he coefficient on the public external debt-to-GDP ratio in the
election equation indicates that more indebted countries are less
ikely to issue sovereign bonds (Gelos et al., 2011) and when they
o, they tend to pay higher prices (the coefficient is significant
nce we control for government effectiveness and even including
ime fixed effects): a 10% increase in the external debt-to-GDP
atio is associated with 10–12 basis-point increase in the primary
pread (columns 5–7). The reinforcing effect of the debt-to-
DP ratio in the selection and outcome equations (columns 5–6)
ould suggest the presence of demand-side effects: high debt
atios would discourage demand from international investors
nd this shift would reduce the price of bonds, with a corre-
ponding increase in primary spreads (Eichengreen and Mody,
000). The negative coefficient on the government budget bal-
nce in the selection equation suggests that the demand for
xternal borrowing is higher when fiscal deficit is larger, sup-
orting the hypothesis that countries in the sample are capital
carce (Grigorian, 2003). By contrast, we do not find a sig-
ificant correlation between the fiscal balance and primary
preads.
008–2014 (results not reported) suggests that the supply-side effects may have
ominated in the last period of global low interest rates.
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Table 6
Regression results: baseline.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var.: SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI
US rates −17.565** −0.147*** −17.404* −0.118*** −2.473 −0.089**
(8.924) (0.038) (8.884) (0.040) (8.298) (0.045)
Vix index 7.955*** −0.010 7.914*** −0.009 7.388*** −0.014
(1.536) (0.008) (1.535) (0.008) (1.579) (0.009)
Real per capita GDP −113.383*** 0.841*** −110.109*** 0.676*** −48.613** 0.573*** −47.163*** 0.584***
(23.018) (0.070) (20.958) (0.074) (22.671) (0.096) (17.907) (0.095)
GDP growth −11.174*** −0.011 −10.769*** −0.015 −10.522** −0.031 −11.821*** −0.015
(4.131) (0.017) (4.130) (0.017) (4.307) (0.020) (3.633) (0.021)
Inflation 0.036 −0.000 0.011 −0.000 −0.559 −0.003 −0.057 −0.004*
(0.082) (0.001) (0.083) (0.001) (0.350) (0.002) (0.382) (0.002)
PPG external debt (% GDP) 0.461 −0.003* 0.502 −0.003* 0.964** −0.004* 1.160*** −0.004
(0.449) (0.002) (0.445) (0.002) (0.462) (0.002) (0.434) (0.002)
Fiscal balance (% GDP) 5.001 −0.076*** 2.656 −0.053*** −4.253 −0.046** −1.155 −0.048**
(5.633) (0.020) (5.166) (0.019) (5.060) (0.021) (4.693) (0.021)
Current account (% GDP) −3.697* −0.002 −3.477* −0.002 −5.784** 0.001 −6.665*** 0.002
(2.126) (0.009) (2.096) (0.009) (2.302) (0.010) (2.367) (0.010)
Reserves (in months of imports) −5.255 −0.038*** −4.692 −0.027* −2.213 −0.035** −4.520 −0.035**
(3.844) (0.014) (3.799) (0.014) (3.593) (0.015) (3.193) (0.015)
IMF program in the previous 3 years 126.043*** 0.542** 124.696*** 0.505* 72.329 0.567** 36.374 0.629**
(44.906) (0.252) (44.348) (0.258) (51.836) (0.267) (48.706) (0.271)
Europe and Central Asia −36.891 0.814*** −21.089 0.536** −38.629 0.616** −56.529 0.626**
(47.754) (0.296) (45.342) (0.271) (43.128) (0.295) (45.858) (0.296)
Latin America and Caribbean 36.016 0.973*** 53.351 0.672** 38.235 0.722** 21.551 0.743**
(43.668) (0.294) (42.737) (0.264) (40.370) (0.281) (43.442) (0.289)
Middle East and North Africa −102.244** 0.174 −96.834** 0.008 −98.469** 0.049 −106.796** 0.017
(40.984) (0.309) (41.639) (0.299) (39.934) (0.304) (43.198) (0.304)
Sub-Saharan Africa 85.966** 0.474* 90.923** 0.341 99.491** 0.382 97.696** 0.346
(40.004) (0.281) (40.762) (0.256) (40.309) (0.263) (46.418) (0.267)
Population 0.437*** 0.355*** 0.362*** 0.359***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
SBI in the previous 3 years −56.122* 0.783*** −50.091 0.720*** −55.434* 0.741***
(31.563) (0.113) (36.810) (0.116) (30.839) (0.116)
Government effectiveness −132.850*** 0.254** −144.313*** 0.260**
(30.270) (0.119) (27.910) (0.120)
Observations 1851 1851 1716 1716
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Wald test (ρ) 0.259 0.169 0.467 0.170
Test year FE . . . 0.000
Test region FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated robust standard errors, of the maximum likelihood estimated of Eqs. (1) and (2). The model is
estimated by two-step Heckman, using Stata 13 SE package with HECKMAN command. The dependent variable is: (1) a dummy equal to one if the country issues
a sovereign bond at time t, and zero otherwise (SBI) in the selection equation and (2) the spread on sovereign bonds at issue (SPREAD) in the outcome equation. The
10-year US Treasury notes yield and the Vix are measured at time t, while all the other variables are averages between t − 3 and t − 1. A constant and year dummies
are included, but coefficients are not shown. The bottom rows report the p-values of a t-test for the joint significance of year and region dummies, and the p-value of
the Wald test for the independence of the two equations (ρ = 0).
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** Significant at 5%.
** Significant at 1%.
Regional dummies are often statistical significant suggesting
hat there are differences in the likelihood to issue sovereign
onds and in primary spreads which are not accounted for by
bserved heterogeneity. Interestingly, while there is no robust
vidence that SSA countries has a higher probability of issu-
ng a bond, the coefficient on the SSA dummy in the outcome
quation is positive and relatively stable across specifications,
ndicating that the average SSA country pays up to 100 basis
oints more than the average Asian country (Asia is the refer-
nce category) and, in general, spreads in SSA are higher than in
l
l
5ll other countries, even after controlling for a large number of
ountry characteristics. This effect is smaller than the one found
y Olabisi and Stein (2015) who, however, control for a much
maller set of covariates.
In columns 3–4, the model is augmented to account for the
act that sovereign bond issuance is likely to be persistent. The
nalysis finds that after its first issuance, a country is more
ikely to issue again in the future, and when it does, spreads are
owered: the reduction in spreads for repeat issuers is about
6 basis points compared to countries that did not issue in the
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Table 7
Regression results: robustness.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Dep. Var.: SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI
Vix index 6.366*** −0.014* 6.749*** −0.016*
(1.647) (0.009) (1.579) (0.008)
Energy prices −0.467 0.002
(0.347) (0.002)
Non-energy prices −1.021* 0.004
(0.541) (0.003)
Real per capita GDP −41.069* 0.580*** −38.419* 0.577*** −52.484** 0.594*** −43.228** 0.578*** −27.399 0.627*** −48.317* 0.507*** 18.463 0.690***
(23.148) (0.095) (22.840) (0.094) (21.338) (0.095) (18.087) (0.094) (17.613) (0.103) (26.146) (0.117) (19.306) (0.091)
GDP growth −10.327** −0.035* −10.593** −0.034* −13.782*** −0.013 −11.623*** −0.016 −10.414*** −0.027 −11.773*** −0.016 −9.360*** 0.008
(4.336) (0.019) (4.272) (0.019) (3.628) (0.020) (3.531) (0.021) (3.358) (0.022) (4.028) (0.021) (2.579) (0.015)
Inflation −0.655** −0.003 −0.628** −0.003 −0.062 −0.003* −0.060 −0.004* −0.262 −0.003* −0.086 −0.004* 3.315*** −0.018***
(0.320) (0.002) (0.312) (0.002) (0.418) (0.002) (0.378) (0.002) (0.344) (0.002) (0.388) (0.002) (1.082) (0.006)
PPG external debt
(% GDP)
1.218** −0.004* 1.261*** −0.004* 1.215*** −0.004* 1.430*** −0.005** 1.100 −0.004* 0.035 −0.002
(0.478) (0.002) (0.470) (0.002) (0.415) (0.002) (0.469) (0.002) (0.676) (0.003) (0.416) (0.002)
Fiscal balance
(% GDP)
−5.278 −0.048** −5.476 −0.049** 1.832 −0.058** 0.234 −0.053** −4.395 −0.041* −2.401 −0.043* −9.134** −0.042**
(4.858) (0.021) (4.800) (0.021) (6.172) (0.025) (5.036) (0.021) (4.273) (0.022) (5.465) (0.022) (4.121) (0.017)
Current account
(% GDP)
−6.563*** −0.000 −6.691*** 0.000 −6.193** 0.002 −5.460** 0.001 −9.041*** −0.009 −8.433*** 0.002 −2.087 −0.004
(2.316) (0.009) (2.296) (0.009) (2.429) (0.010) (2.298) (0.009) (1.967) (0.011) (3.259) (0.010) (1.842) (0.008)
Reserves (in months
of imports)
−0.220 −0.032** 0.273 −0.033** −7.125** −0.031** −4.563 −0.035** −7.700*** −0.026* −2.656 −0.033** −9.128*** −0.027*
(3.359) (0.015) (3.250) (0.015) (3.349) (0.015) (3.246) (0.016) (2.957) (0.016) (3.666) (0.016) (2.598) (0.014)
Government
effectiveness
−149.285*** 0.236** −154.036*** 0.237** −128.729*** 0.232** −150.644*** 0.315** −167.195*** 0.162 −160.325*** 0.274** −115.155*** 0.062
(31.598) (0.118) (31.304) (0.117) (26.101) (0.117) (27.588) (0.124) (24.962) (0.127) (35.143) (0.122) (30.775) (0.112)
IMF program in the
previous 3 years
52.235 0.532** 50.858 0.526** 42.695 0.623** 35.630 0.638** 48.166 0.553** 26.917 0.598** 176.918*** 1.031***
(51.601) (0.267) (50.616) (0.267) (51.906) (0.280) (49.074) (0.272) (43.709) (0.279) (59.764) (0.282) (60.396) (0.237)
SBI in the previous
3 years
−50.597 0.723*** −51.947 0.727*** −52.917 0.724*** −51.318 0.735*** −53.870** 0.744*** −80.163* 0.772*** 82.014*** 0.847***
(33.506) (0.116) (32.776) (0.116) (42.911) (0.117) (32.866) (0.116) (26.637) (0.124) (44.797) (0.119) (27.637) (0.116)
Europe and Central
Asia
−50.192 0.616** −55.382 0.623** 1.584 0.457 −97.273** 0.742** −12.072 0.510 −66.555 0.648**
(43.092) (0.294) (43.698) (0.293) (45.059) (0.290) (46.280) (0.295) (48.344) (0.323) (53.559) (0.318)
Latin America and
Caribbean
28.635 0.709** 23.113 0.718*** 48.181 0.682** −17.941 0.831*** 118.395** 0.584* 6.234 0.748**
(40.161) (0.278) (40.683) (0.278) (45.809) (0.285) (44.561) (0.287) (46.286) (0.317) (55.221) (0.295)
Middle East and North
Africa
−105.163** 0.039 −106.964** 0.043 −117.245*** 0.032 −145.911*** 0.091 −44.088 −0.057 −117.354** 0.020
(41.674) (0.302) (42.480) (0.302) (39.843) (0.300) (40.853) (0.301) (50.558) (0.327) (48.147) (0.306)
Sub-Saharan Africa 106.978*** 0.398 107.741*** 0.397 109.444** 0.297 96.832** 0.334 106.905** 0.350 114.625* 0.359
(41.478) (0.264) (41.663) (0.264) (45.452) (0.262) (42.129) (0.273) (48.957) (0.291) (67.098) (0.272)
Population 0.365*** 0.364*** 0.360*** 0.362*** 0.373*** 0.333*** 0.327***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045) (0.043)
Total public debt
(% GDP)
1.193** −0.004
(0.500) (0.003)
Resource rich dummy −96.122** 0.316*
(42.315) (0.179)
Capital account
openness
−24.429*** 0.064
(5.986) (0.041)
Aid (% GDP) −3.023 −0.014
(8.510) (0.019)
Observations 1716 1716 1723 1716 1599 1668 1605
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald test (ρ) 0.421 0.409 0.514 0.286 0.184 0.236 0.001
Test year FE . . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test region FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated robust standard errors, of the maximum likelihood estimated of Eqs. (1) and (2). The model is
estimated by two-step Heckman, using Stata 13 SE package with HECKMAN command. The dependent variable is: (1) a dummy equal to one if the country issues
a sovereign bond at time t, and zero otherwise (SBI) in the selection equation and (2) the spread on sovereign bonds at issue (SPREAD) in the outcome equation. All
control variables are averages between t − 3 and t − 1; in columns 13–14, instead, they are measured in t − 1, with the exception of the dummies for past SBI and
IMF programs in the previous three years. A constant and year dummies are included, but coefficients are not shown. The bottom rows report the p-values of a t-test
for the joint significance of year and region dummies, and the p-value of the Wald test for the independence of the two equations (ρ = 0).
* Significant at 10%.
*
p
h
t
m
b
s
e
(** Significant at 5%.
** Significant at 1%.
revious three years. This result lends further support to the
ypothesis of the presence of fixed costs in accessing interna-
20ional capital markets.
Results in columns 5–6 control for institutional strength,
easured by the index of government effectiveness, which the
20 This finding is consistent with that of Guscina et al. (2014) with first-time
ond issuances trading at higher spreads, even after controlling for a standard
et of macroeconomic and institutional variables.
t
l
s
t
s
s
cxisting literature has identified as a key driver of market access
Thomas, 2009; Gelos et al., 2011), at the cost of reducing
he sample size. Greater government effectiveness increases the
ikelihood of sovereign bond issuance and lowers its cost: a one
tandard deviation increase in the index of government effec-
iveness is associated with 80 basis points reduction in primary
preads. The inclusion of government effectiveness causes a
harp reduction of the coefficient on per capita real GDP asso-
iated with bond spreads and the coefficient on the US rate is
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Table 8
Issuances and primary bond spreads in Sub-Saharan Africa.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var.: SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI SPREAD SBI
Sub-Saharan Africa 103.185*** −0.030 194.137** 0.673 207.992* 0.604 −202.024 −1.730*** 373.220 −2.510***
(35.574) (0.142) (89.987) (0.425) (119.936) (0.472) (304.980) (0.516) (336.749) (0.599)
US rates −4.544 −0.079* −3.310 −0.046 −4.783 −0.079*
(9.234) (0.045) (9.014) (0.050) (9.255) (0.045)
Vix index 7.102*** −0.015* 7.059*** −0.014* 7.514*** −0.009 6.162*** −0.015* 6.455*** −0.018**
(1.647) (0.008) (1.642) (0.009) (1.695) (0.009) (1.667) (0.009) (1.662) (0.009)
Energy prices −0.432 −0.000
(0.345) (0.002)
Non-energy prices −0.931* −0.000
(0.557) (0.003)
Sub-Saharan Africa*US
rates
−30.940 −0.209*
(26.950) (0.116)
Sub-Saharan Africa*Vix
index
−5.822 −0.033
(6.232) (0.024)
Sub-Saharan
Africa*Energy prices
2.887 0.017***
(2.673) (0.005)
Sub-Saharan
Africa*Non-energy
prices
−2.598 0.028***
(3.347) (0.007)
Real p r capita GDP −44.188 0.669*** −42.937 0.667*** −44.184 0.665*** −38.709 0.680*** −33.695 0.680***
(34.925) (0.086) (35.878) (0.087) (35.933) (0.086) (34.590) (0.087) (38.064) (0.088)
GDP growth −12.461*** −0.038* −12.953*** −0.040** −12.852*** −0.040** −12.676*** −0.043** −12.394*** −0.042**
(4.481) (0.020) (4.613) (0.020) (4.503) (0.020) (4.654) (0.020) (4.457) (0.021)
Inflation −0.665 −0.002 −0.683 −0.003 −0.678 −0.002 −0.787* −0.003 −0.754* −0.003
(0.450) (0.002) (0.459) (0.002) (0.456) (0.002) (0.430) (0.002) (0.412) (0.002)
PPG external debt
(% GDP)
0.349 −0.004* 0.378 −0.003 0.344 −0.004* 0.643 −0.002 0.636 −0.002
(0.476) (0.002) (0.463) (0.002) (0.477) (0.002) (0.464) (0.002) (0.482) (0.002)
Fiscal balance (% GDP) −1.916 −0.027 −0.886 −0.025 −1.859 −0.027 −2.366 −0.029 −4.047 −0.030
(6.147) (0.018) (6.448) (0.018) (6.238) (0.018) (6.164) (0.018) (6.558) (0.018)
Current account
(% GDP)
−5.590** −0.005 −5.697** −0.003 −5.519** −0.003 −6.564*** −0.004 −6.198** −0.005
(2.437) (0.009) (2.511) (0.009) (2.486) (0.009) (2.543) (0.009) (2.662) (0.010)
Reserves (in months
of imports)
−0.891 −0.041*** −0.967 −0.041*** −0.863 −0.041*** 1.117 −0.039*** 1.819 −0.040***
(3.484) (0.013) (3.499) (0.014) (3.490) (0.013) (3.308) (0.014) (3.239) (0.014)
IMF program in the
previous 3 years
92.347 0.764*** 92.664 0.742*** 93.708 0.775*** 72.219 0.696*** 69.384 0.682***
(62.958) (0.254) (63.077) (0.255) (64.610) (0.253) (61.882) (0.255) (63.127) (0.255)
SBI in the previous
3 years
−17.203 0.799*** −16.950 0.785*** −19.619 0.800*** −19.036 0.782*** −18.122 0.787***
(57.564) (0.116) (58.290) (0.115) (60.036) (0.116) (54.202) (0.116) (61.138) (0.116)
Government
effectiveness
−127.221*** 0.223** −128.360*** 0.226** −126.671*** 0.229** −144.239*** 0.208* −148.786*** 0.207*
(30.274) (0.111) (30.111) (0.112) (30.325) (0.111) (30.997) (0.110) (31.533) (0.109)
Population 0.351*** 0.349*** 0.348*** 0.351*** 0.353***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Observations 1716 1716 1716 1716 1716
Region FE No No No No No
Year FE No No No No No
Wald test (ρ) 0.932 0.942 0.932 0.947 0.991
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated robust standard errors, of the maximum likelihood estimated of Eqs. (1) and (2). The model is
estimated by two-step Heckman, using Stata 13 SE package with HECKMAN command. The dependent variable is: (1) a dummy equal to one if the country issues
a sovereign bond at time t, and zero otherwise (SBI) in the selection equation and (2) the spread on sovereign bonds at issue (SPREAD) in the outcome equation. The
10-year US Treasury notes yield, the Vix, and the energy and non-energy price indexes are measured at time t, while all the other variables are averages between
t − 3 and t − 1. A constant, is included, but not shown. The bottom row reports the p-value of the Wald test for the independence of the two equations (ρ = 0).
* Significant at 10%.
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** Significant at 1%.
ess precisely estimated, while we still find evidence that spreads
ncrease in periods of market volatility.
Finally, in columns 7–8, we model global shocks with time
xed effects rather than with the inclusion of the yield on the
0-year US Treasury note and the Vix index. The results on the
omestic factors are broadly unaffected (the negative correlation
etween inflation and the probability of bond issuance becomes
ignificant) and time fixed effects are jointly significant, lending
urther support to the hypothesis that common global factors
atter for market access by EMDEs.
a
T
o.3.  Robustness
The robustness analysis focuses mainly on the potential role
f additional external and domestic factors in affecting mar-
et access. First, given that strong correlation between capital
nflows to developing countries and commodity prices, we con-
ider the role of energy and non-energy prices in driving market
ccess by developing countries. In columns 1–2 and 3–4 of
able 7 we replace the US rate with, respectively, the index
f energy prices and the one of non-energy prices published
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y the World Bank (2015). Results on the domestic factors are
roadly in line with what shown in Table 6 (columns 5–6) and
he Vix turns out to be significant also in the selection equation,
ndicating that periods of higher market volatility are associated
ith a lower probability of issuance and with higher primary
ond spreads. Commodity prices, instead, are not associated
ith issuances, but only with bond spreads, which are lower
hen non-energy prices are higher.
Then, we consider a set of additional domestic factors that
ould affect market access. We take the last specification of
able 5 (columns 7–8), including the dummy variable for past
ond issuances, government effectiveness and year fixed effects,
s reference. We test the robustness of our findings by including a
et of alternative domestic macroeconomic control variables. We
tart by controlling for the level of total public debt, rather than
easuring exclusively public and publicly guaranteed external
ebt, and we find that the two debt indicators have similar effects,
s higher public debt ratios are associated with higher bond
preads (Table 7, columns 5–6). The inclusion of a dummy
ariable for resource-rich economies does not alter the base-
ine results and shows that natural resource rich countries are
ore likely to issue sovereign bonds and pay lower prices
han other countries (columns 7–8). Further, the Chinn and
to (2006) de  jure  measure of financial openness shows that
ountries with more open capital accounts can issue at a signifi-
ant lower spread than less financially open sovereigns. We also
ugment the model by adding the ratio of aid inflows to GDP,
n order to control for the possibility that countries with easier
ccess to grants and concessional loans could have a smaller
emand for non-concessional financing (columns 11–12); our
esults indicate that market access for countries depending
ore on foreign aid does not differ significantly from other
ountries.
Finally, in columns 13 and 14 all domestic variables are mea-
ured at time t −  1 (rather than averaged over the three-year
eriod before the issuance). Results are quite similar to the base-
ine, even though there are few notable exceptions: (1) higher
nternational reserves and stronger fiscal balances are signifi-
antly associated with lower primary spreads, and (2) a higher
nflation is associated with a lower probability to issue and to
igher primary spreads.
.4.  Is  market  access  in  Africa  different?
Given the new wave of external borrowing by a number of
frican countries over the last decade, and given that bonds
ssued by SSA countries are, on average, larger relative to the
ize of the domestic economy and are issued at a premium
ompared to the ones issued by other developing countries (see
ables 4 and 6), it is interesting to investigate whether the corre-
ation between global conditions and bond issuances in SSA is
ifferent than in other regions. Siklos (2011) provides some evi-
ence that bond markets in the region are decoupled from those
n other parts of the world, in line with a lower level of interna-
ional financial integration of African economies. Alternatively,
ne could argue that global factors are relatively more impor-
ant for international lenders when investing in SSA sovereign
s
i
t
flopment Finance 6 (2016) 1–15
onds than in more advanced financial markets. To discriminate
etween these two hypotheses, in Table 8 we replicate out main
nalysis including a dummy for SSA countries rather than the
et of regional dummies and then we interact the SSA dummy
ith the different global factors that have been shown to affect
arket access.
Results confirm that, once several macroeconomic character-
stics are taken into consideration, countries in SSA are equally
ikely to issue sovereign bonds than other countries, but they
ssue at a premium of more than 100 basis points. Moreover,
hile market volatility affects all countries in the same way,
S interest rates and commodity prices have a much stronger
ssociation with issuances in SSA than elsewhere. In particu-
ar, low interest rates and high commodity (both energy and
on-energy) prices are associated with a higher likelihood of
ssuance by SSA countries, while this is not the case for other
egions. Thus, the general correlation between global liquidity
nd bond issuances seems to be driven by African issuers. This
esult is consistent with SSA issuances having being clustered
n recent years, when US rates have been at a record-low level
nd commodity prices boomed (Fig. 2), but, at the same time, it
ndicates the presence of some vulnerabilities related to a decline
n commodity price and monetary policy normalization in
he US.
.  Conclusions
Our analysis, drawing on the experience of emerging mar-
ets and developing economies that have gained market access,
rovides some messages for LIDCs and African countries that
re accessing international markets in recent years. Countries
ith higher public debts and weak governance are less likely to
ssue sovereign bonds than their peers. Moreover, countries with
ound external positions, as reflected in the current account bal-
nce, strong economic growth, and low public debts can issue
overeign bonds at a lower premium than other countries. Global
onditions also matters for bond issuances, as they are more
ikely in periods of global liquidity and high commodity prices,
hile primary spreads are lower in periods of low market volatil-
ty. Finally, we also observe that SSA countries are more exposed
han countries in other regions to global conditions and they pay
 premium of about 100 basis points when issuing sovereign
onds.
These findings, though not to be interpreted in a causal way,
ould suggest that frontier markets and first-time sovereign
ond issuers should fulfill certain preconditions—building a
ecord of good economic performance, ensuring a sound fiscal
nd external positions—in order to successfully attract foreign
nvestors (Das et al., 2008; Guscina et al., 2014).
Given the ongoing trend in sovereign bond issuances by
IDCs, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, further analysis will
e needed to better understand the real effects of SBIs on the
caling up of public investment, growth and debt sustainability,
n order to have a more informed framework to assess the poten-
ial benefits and risks of alternative sources of external financing
or frontier markets.
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